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 Abstract 
 
The compulsory occupational pension and insurance system, along with personal 
savings and family supports, form the backbone of social security in Taiwan. Due to the 
relatively low contribution ratio, public sector pensions, as well as private sector 
pensions, are seriously under-funded, and this will lay enormous pressure on future 
government budgets if reforms are not implemented soon. The new Labor Pension Bill 
will make drastic policy shifts from defined benefit to defined contribution, from 
non-portable to portable, and finally from government management of funds to partial 
private management.  Taiwan 
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1  Introduction 
The compulsory occupational pension and insurance system, along with personal savings and family 
supports, form the backbone of social security in Taiwan.    While a new national pension system covering 
the basic needs of the elderly has been considered since 1993, the first pillar has not been the center of 
discussion until recently.  Currently, the income replacement ratios for government employees often 
exceed 80%.    On the other hand, employees from the private sector receive much lower pension payments, 
not to mention they are also subject to considerable employer default risk. 
The new Labor Pension Bill will make drastic policy shifts from defined benefit to defined 
contribution, from non-portable to portable, and finally from government management of funds to partial 
private management.   Nevertheless, due to the relatively low contribution ratio, public sector pensions, as 
well as private sector pensions, are seriously under-funded, and this will lay enormous pressure on future 
government budgets if reforms are not implemented soon. 
2  Historical Background 
A series of compulsory occupational insurance and pension laws have been enacted since 1950.  In 
2002, over 80% of the working population are covered by one or more social insurance or pension plans. 
1950  Military  Personnel  Insurance 
1958  Labor  Insurance  Act 
1958  Public  Servant  Insurance  Act 
1985  Labor  Standards  Law 
1980  Private  School  Teachers  Insurance  Act 
1985  Farmers  Insurance  Act 
1994  National  Health  Insurance  Act 
1993  Civil  Servants  Retirement  Law and Civil Service Pension Law 
2001    Draft of the Statute of Labor Pension passed by the Executive Yuan 
2003    Revised Draft of the Statute passed by the Labor, Welfare and Environment Committee of the 
Legislative Yuan  
  
[Insert Table 1] 
3  Current Scheme 
3.1   The  Public  Sector 
Working in the public sector is considered by most in Taiwan as a stable, low-risk life style.  While 
income on the job is mediocre, its retirement pension is very attractive.  The combination of the Civil 
Servants Pension and the Government Employees and School Teachers Insurance provides an income 
replacement ratio greater than 80% for a government employee serving 35 years before retirement.  For 
one retiring at around 50 years old with 25 years of public service history, he or she can often find new 
jobs and enjoy double income. 
Civil Servants Pension 
The monthly contributions to the Public Service Pension Fund (PSPF) are set by law to be between 
8 to 12 percent of the doubled amount of the basis salaries (equivalent to 100 to 120 percent of the full 
salary, hereafter base amount) from its participants.  The contribution rate was 8% before January 
2002.  The current rate is 8.8%, and will be raised gradually to 12% by year 2006.  The participants pay 
35 percent of the total contribution, while the government, the employer, pays the remaining 65 
percent.  The official retirement age is 65.  A participant who has served for 25 years or more can apply 
for an early retirement.   If his or her service exceeds 15 years, a participant can choose among three forms 
of pension payments: lump-sum payment, monthly payment, or mixed pension.  A participant with less 
than 15 years of service is only entitled to the lump-sum payment.  For lump-sum payment, 150% of the 
base amount would be disbursed for every year of service, with a maximum of 35 years, or 53 base 
amounts.  Under monthly payment, the retiree, for every year of service, is entitled to 2% of the base 
amount of an official with identical rank on the effective retirement date.  The maximum is 35 years, or Taiwan 
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70% of the base amount.  Since the monthly payments are linked to the salary of current workers, the 
pension is effectively inflation hedged.   If the mixed pension is chosen, a portion of pension is paid 
lump-sum, and the remaining is paid monthly.  If the retiree who opts for monthly pension or mixed 
pension dies, a lump-sum of survivor annuity will be paid to the bereaved.  Since the expected present 
value of the monthly pension is much higher than the lump-sum pension, over 90 percent of the retirees 
have chosen the monthly or mixed pensions. 
Table 2 calculates the actuarially fair contribution ratios under different scenarios.    As shown, if 0% 
of the plan’s original participants choose monthly payment (i.e., they all choose lump-sum payment), the 
actuarially fair contribution ratio is 12.7%.    On the other hand, if everyone chooses monthly payment, the 
fair rate should be 35.2%.    Numbers for new participants shows similar results. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Government Employees’ and School Staffs’ Insurance 
In addition to public servants and public school teachers, private school teachers are also included in 
the Government Employees’ and School Staffs’ Insurance.  The insurance covers disability, death, and 
old-age pension.  The insurance premium is set by law to be 4.5% to 9% of the insured salary.  The 
current rate is 7.15%.  A plan participant pays 35 percent of the premium, while government and the 
employer pay the remaining 65 percent.  The old-age pension is calculated as 120% of monthly insured 
salary times the year of service, with a maximum of 36 month.   It is paid in lump-sum when a participant 
retires. 
3.2  The Private Sector 
Employees in the private sector, except for farmers, are required by law to participate in the Labor 
Insurance.   For Labor Insurance, an employer’s responsibility is to contribute to the Labor Insurance 
Fund as required.  All the payments to the insured labors will come from this Fund.   Currently, 
compliance with the Labor Insurance System is nearly 100 percent. 
In addition, employers are required by law to put a portion of their employees’ salaries to the Labor 
Pension Fund as reserves for future pensions as employees retire.   Both Labor Insurance and Labor 
Pension are defined benefit plans, but the former is portable, while the latter is not.  If a firm’s 
accumulated contributions and investment returns are not sufficient to pay the pension specified by the 
Labor Standard Law when its employees retire, the employer bears the ultimate responsibility.  Due to 
various problems of the system, nearly 80% of the employers (who hire 60% of the total labor in Taiwan) 
do not contribute to the Labor Pension Fund. 
Labor Insurance 
Started in 1950, Labor Insurance is the earliest social insurance in Taiwan.   Every private 
establishment with 5 or more employees is required to participate in the plan.  Around 7.5 million people 
were insured by the Labor Insurance at the end of 2002.  The plan insures against maternity, disability, 
injury, death, unemployment.  It also provides an old-age pension.  Health insurance used to be one of 
the major tasks of the Labor Insurance, but this has been taken over by the National Health Insurance since 
1995.  The insurance premium is set by law to be 6.5% to 11% of the insured salary.  The current rate is 
5.5% for those who are not eligible for unemployment insurance and 6.5% for the others.   Employees pay 
a mere 20% of the premium, employers pay 70%, and the government pays the other 10%.  An insured 
person who has been insured for 25 years and reached the age of 50, or who has been insured for 15 years 
and reached the age of 55 is eligible for the old-age pension.  Each of the first 15 coverage years will be 
disbursed 1 average monthly insured salary, and each of the additional years will be paid 2 average 
monthly salaries, with a maximum of 45 months.   The payment is lump-sum, but it is expected to convert 
to an annuity before the end of 2004. 
Labor Pension 
The Labor Pension Fund was established following the 1984 enactment of the Labor Standards Law, 
which stipulates minimum standards of labor conditions and protects workers rights and interests.  The 
law applies to all forms of employee-employer relationships in the private sector.  Retirement payment is Taiwan 
  3
one of the employer’s obligations under the Law.  To obtain the retirement payment, a worker must have 
worked for 25 years or have worked for 15 years and reached the age of 55 under the same employer.   The 
retirement benefit is neither portable nor vested. 
However, the average life of firms in Taiwan is 13 years, while employees’ average length of service 
in the same firm is 8.6 years.   Those who are employed in large enterprises, especially state-owned 
enterprises, are most likely to fulfill the retirement requirements, and really receive the retirement 
payments.   For employees of small firms, retirement benefits are more like pies painted on the wall.    You 
can see them, but you can not eat them.   Under this plan, a worker qualified for retirement payments shall 
receive two months’ salary, based on the average monthly salary over the six months prior to his or her 
retirement, for each year of service.  For service years in excess of 15 years, however, each year shall 
receive 1 month salary.  The maximum payment is 45 month salary.  To fund the retirement obligations, 
an employer must deposit an amount from 2% to 15% of employees’ salary to the Labor Pension Fund 
each month, as a reserve for future payments.  The Fund maintains separate accounts for participating 
firms.  When a worker retires, the retirement payment is drawn from his or her firm’s account.  If the 
money left in an account is not sufficient, the employer is responsible for the balance. 
3.3  Welfare Allowance Programs 
Welfare Allowance programs provide monthly allowances for senior citizens.   Funding for these 
programs is from the regular government budget.  The motivations of these programs, however, were 
twofold: social security and political consideration.   While these allowances undoubtedly offer a shield to 
protect the basic living needs of destitute senior citizens, they are often criticized for also including the 
wealthy.  Critiques of these programs argue that these resources can be obviously employed more 
effectively elsewhere.  Although many people consider these allowances vote-buying, very few 
politicians are willing to speak against them. 
Old-Age Farmers’ Allowance Program 
The Temporary Act for the Old-Age Farmers’ Allowance Program was promulgated in 
1995.   Qualified old-age farmers can receive a monthly allowance of NT$3,000.   The Act was later 
revised to include old-age fishermen.   The amount of the allowance is increased to NT$4,000 from 
January 2004.
1[1] 
Old-Age Citizens’ Welfare Allowance 
The Temporary Act of Old-Age Citizens’ Welfare Allowance was enacted in 2002.   Citizens over 65 
years old can apply for a NT$3,000 monthly allowance regardless of their income and wealth level. 
4  Asset Allocations and Investment Performances of Pension Funds 
All compulsory occupational pension and insurance funds are managed by government entities.   The 
asset allocation decisions of the Labor Insurance Fund and the Labor Pension Fund must follow specific 
guidelines.   For example, both funds have a 30% limit on assets invested in equity.   Public Service 
Pension Fund, which was established in 1995, the latest of these funds, applies the prudent-men rule when 
making asset allocation decisions.  Both the Labor Pension Fund and the Public Service Pension Fund 
guarantee minimum rates of return.   If the funds’ annual return is lower than the 2-year bank deposit rate, 
government has to make up the difference.   To avoid unnecessary trouble, the asset allocations of 
Taiwanese pension funds tend to be conservative.   Table 3 demonstrates the asset sizes and asset 
allocations of three major pension funds in Taiwan.  Bank deposits accounts for 25.92% of the Public 
Service Pension Fund’s asset, 44.24% of the Labor Pension Fund, and 57.66% of the Labor Insurance Fund.   
The proportion of assets invested in short-term fixed income assets are 45.33%, 59.15%, and 58.70% 
respectively.  These numbers, which exceed liquidity needs, are much higher than their international 
counterparts.  Internally managed stock investments represent approximately 20% of these funds’ assets.  
                                            
1[1] Average disposable income per household is NT$703,171 for farmers, and NT$895,568 for non-farmers in 2002. 
One US dollar equals NT$33.97 at December 31, 2003.       Taiwan 
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Designated management is mainly domestic stock mandates.  Over 99% of funds’ assets are invested 
domestically.  Overseas investments are expected to increase gradually over the next few years.  Assets 
of three funds totaled NT$ 1 trillion dollars (USD 30 billion) in 2003, about 10% of Taiwan’s GDP. 
[Insert Table 3] 
With little international diversification, the returns of Taiwanese pension funds are mainly determined 
by the short-term interest rates and the performance of Taiwan’s stock market.  Table 4 shows annual 
returns of the Public Service Pension Fund, the statutory minimum rate (2-year bank deposit interest rate), 
and returns of the Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighted Index from January 1996 to November 2003.  The 
average annual return is 5.8%.    Notice that the correlation between the fund’s returns and the stock index 
returns seems to be much lower than expected.   However, the fund’s return exceeds the guaranteed return 
every year.   The above phenomenon can be explained easily by the fact that PSPF, as well as other 
government managed funds report realized returns, instead of changes in the market value of 
assets.   Therefore, it is easy to smooth the return.   Accounting for stock value losses since May 2000, the 
cumulative return of the PSPF will be a little less than that shown in Table 4.  The investment 
performances of the Labor Pension Fund and Labor Insurance Fund are similar to that of PSPF.    
[Insert Table 4] 
5  Economic Status of the Elderly 
5.1  Population Aging Begins 
The population of Taiwan is expected to be fairly stable for the next 50 years. It is projected to grow 
from 22.2 million in 2000 to 24.6 million in 2030, before decreasing to 22.2 million in 2050.  However, 
the structure of the population will experience drastic changes.   The elderly (65 years and above) accounts 
for 9% of the population in 2000.   This number will exceed 10% by 2008, and exceed 20% by 2029.   By 
2050, elderly people are estimated to represent 29% of the population.  Meanwhile, the proportion of the 
working population (20-64 years) will fall from 62% to 52% by 2050.  Evidently, the population will be 
aging rapidly in the next 50 years (see Table 5 and Figure 1).    
[Insert Table 5] 
[Insert Figure 1] 
A similar trend can be observed from the age ratio.  In 2000, Taiwan’s dependency ratio is 7.2, 
almost twice the number of developed countries.   Nevertheless, it is estimated to drop to 3.4 by 2025, and 
1.8 by 2050, which is not much higher than Japan and Germany, and even lower than Sweden, UK and 
United States (see Table6).  
[Insert Table 6] 
5.2  Income Sources of the Elderly 
Table 7 presents surveys on the income sources of the elderly in Taiwan.  The Ministry of Interior 
Affairs has conducted these surveys since 1986.  Since the survey intervals and methodologies are not 
consistent, the numbers in Table 7 must be read with care.  However, it is apparent that the elderly’s 
income dependence on their offspring is decreasing, while the reliance on the social security system is 
increasing. 
[Insert Table 7] 
It is a tradition in the Chinese society for the young, in return for their upbringing, to support the 
living of their elderly parents.   For example, it is common for parents to buy or pay the down-payment of 
the first houses of their grown-up children.   Having invested heavily on their children, it is natural for old 
parents to depend on them.  In 1986, as high as two thirds of the elderly’s income comes from their 
children, comparing a mere quarter from his/her retirement pension.   However, the portion of income from 
children has decreased to 47% by 2000, and the trend is expected to persist.  One of the explanations for 
this downturn is that the average number of children has dropped drastically in the last 50 years, which 
substantially reduces the number of children each elderly can depend on.   In addition, new generations are 
more self-oriented, and less willing to support elderly parents.   Now, “save money for the old age.” instead 
of “raise children for the old age.” are believed by most Taiwanese. Taiwan 
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By 2000, personal savings and pensions on average only constitute 24.7% of income.  Some elderly 
people continue to work after 65 years old, but their income from work is significantly lower than the 
younger groups (see Table 8). The enacting of the Old-Age Farmers’ Allowance Program in 1995, and the 
monthly allowance thereafter may explain the rise of income from social security.   The number will 
further increase after the Old-Age Citizens’ Welfare Allowance is distributed in 2002. 
[Insert Table 8] 
6  Major Issues 
6.1  Asset Management: A Learning Process 
Compared to many developed countries, Taiwanese pension funds are relatively young.   Many 
concepts and optimal practices have not been introduced until the past few years and experiences were 
acquired through the pain of past mistakes.   Nevertheless, there exists an open, willing-to-change 
atmosphere in Taiwan’s pension society, including government officials, scholars, and the asset 
management industry.           
Fiduciary Duty 
All compulsory pension and insurance funds are currently managed by government entities.  Every 
fund has a supervisory committee and/or a management committee, which holds 4 to 8 annual meetings to 
determine major issues of the fund, such as annual budget, asset allocation decisions, external manager 
appointments, and performance evaluation.   Committee members consist of representatives from different 
departments of the government, representatives of the plan participants, scholars, and experts in related 
fields.  Most committee members are invited by the chairperson of the committee, who is usually a high 
ranking officer of the Central Competent Authority.  Pension fund officials who run daily operations are 
under direct supervision of the committee chairperson. 
It often takes a while, or an investment loss, for a committee chairperson to adjust and perceive 
himself as a pension trustee who holds fiduciary duty solely to the plan participants, and not a government 
officer responsible for the whole country.   Similar to many other Asian countries, this situation stems from 
the fact that many people in Taiwan still believe in parental government.   For example, whenever there is a 
stock market crash, investors often sound off their request that government should “stabilize” the 
market.  The Four Big Funds: Labor Pension Fund, Labor Insurance Fund, Public Service Pension Fund, 
and Postal Savings Fund were directed several times in the past decade to purchase stocks while other 
investors were selling.   Some earlier experiences were not bad.   Funds realized excess returns when 
market rebounded several months after their actions.  Therefore, many people, including politicians and 
government officials, really believe that market stabilizing policies are a win-win for pension funds and the 
country.   However, the burst of the high-tech bubble in May 2000, and the world-wide recession till 2002, 
were too serious for any government or funds to counter.  Four Big Funds suffered big losses in their 
market stabilization activities.   After this, people have realized and agreed that “managed by the 
government” does not translate into “working for the government.”   Nevertheless, Fiduciary duties are not 
explicitly stipulated in current pension and social insurance laws.  In the proposed revision of the Civil 
Service Pension Law and the Draft of the Statute of Labor Pension, entities involved in management or 
supervision of pension funds shall bear fiduciary duties. 
Asset Allocation 
Short-term assets, especially bank deposits, account for a major portion of Taiwanese pension funds’ 
total assets.  Aversion of short-term price risk is certainly a key factor of this decision.  The Lack of a 
liquid bond market, on the other hand, is yet another.   However, the 40%-60% money market instruments 
shown in Table 3 have been the results of constant efforts to increase the maturity and return of funds’ 
assets in the past few years.  For example, bank deposits accounted for 98% of total assets of the Labor 
Insurance Fund just 10 years ago. Increasing stock investments brought new challenges, however.  The 
trainings and experiences of pension fund officials are not geared towards equity investment.  Moreover, 
the budget for research resources is very limited.  The consensus is that investment requiring extensive 
resources, such as active stock investment, should mostly rely on external professional managers.  PSPF Taiwan 
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has held many meetings and hearings to prepare for rules regarding designated management.  In 2001, 
PSPF announced the first outsourcing case in Taiwanese pension funds, and gave out a total of NT$15 
billion to nine Taiwanese security investment trust companies to invest in the Taiwan Stock market.   Other 
pension funds followed in a few months.  However, the first round of designated management was not 
very successful.   Pension funds have expected too much from external managers.   For instance, the return 
target was set to achieve an average return of 12% or more, and also beat the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Index in the 2-year period.   Anyone familiar with the basic concepts would know that it’s very difficult to 
meet both absolute and relative return targets.  Interestingly, every asset management company applying 
for the business explained confidently how it would achieve both targets.   Without a reasonable target and 
rigorous risk control operations, most external managers ended up with negative returns, while the stock 
index had slight gains for the same period.  Pension funds and asset management companies learned fast 
from the first lesson.   The return targets became more realistic and the performances of external managers 
exhibited more stability.   Now, pension funds are the most important clients for asset management 
companies in Taiwan. 
Like many emerging markets, Taiwan’s stock market is very volatile with a standard deviation of 
annual return at around 50%.  International diversification would greatly improve the return/risk ratio for 
Taiwanese pension funds.  However, the Central Bank (authority on foreign exchange) is not fond of 
pension funds investing overseas, worrying that pension funds’ international money flows will cause 
unnecessary disturbances for the Bank’s foreign exchange operations.   In 2002, after years of fighting and 
negotiations, Central Bank finally approved a US$500 million FX quota for PSPF to invest abroad.   PSPF 
announced its request for proposals to international asset management companies in August 2003.   After a 
long and rigorous selection process, five international asset management companies, each with a US$100 
million mandate, were selected in December 2003.   An international custodian bank was also 
selected.  Other Taiwanese pension funds are expected to start their international diversifications in 2004. 
6.2  Under-Funding 
Currently, the contribution ratio is much lower than the actuarially fair ratio for almost every pension 
and social insurance fund in Taiwan.  As Table 2 demonstrates, when 76.3% of PSPF pension is paid 
monthly (the expected mix), the actuarially fair contribution rate is 26.4%, which is much higher than the 
current 8.9%, or 12% rate by 2006.    Unfunded liabilities for the PSPF are estimated to be NT$717 billion 
by the end of 2002.  Table 9 shows the Labor Insurance Fund’s annual balances and estimated payments 
if all eligible workers apply for their retirement payments then.    The cash balances accumulated fast after 
1994 when National Health Insurance included medical expenses.  The Fund’s balance peaked at 2001 
totaling NT$484 billion.  Cash outflows exceed inflows after 2002, and the fund size begins to shrink.  
The 2002 cash balance of NT$457 billion is insufficient to meet the retirement payments due, which totals 
NT$658 billion.    If all eligible workers who have not applied for their retirement payments rush to apply, 
Labor Insurance Fund will run out of cash immediately.    According to the 2003 actuary report, the present 
value of the Fund’s unfunded liabilities is NT$1.9 trillion.    The combined liabilities of the Public Service 
Pension Fund and the Labor Insurance Fund sum up to NT$2.6 trillion, which is 26% of Taiwan’s GDP or 
200% of the government revenue in 2002.
2[2] 
[Insert Table 9] 
6.3  New Labor Pension System Needed 
As stated above, to obtain the retirement payment, a worker must have worked for 25 years or reached 
the age of 55 and have worked for 15 years for the same employer.  The retirement benefit is neither 
portable nor vested.  The average life of firms in Taiwan is 13 years, while employees’ average length of 
service in the same firm is 8.6 years.    Most employees of small to medium firms do not believe that they 
                                            
2[2] PSPF assumes 3.65% discount rate, and 1% increase in the discount rate reduces the under-funding amount by 
16%.    Labor Insurance Fund assumes 3.5% discount rate. Taiwan 
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can actually receive the retirement payments as stated in the Labor Standard Law.  By the same token, 
many employers do not believe they actually have to pay the retirement payments either.  Therefore, 
about 80% of firms do not contribute to the labor pension fund and fines for noncompliance are not 
significant enough to provide employers with incentives.    Even for those employers who do contribute to 
the Labor Pension Fund, they often merely contribute 2% of employees’ salary to meet the minimum 
requirement, which is apparently not enough for future payments.  Some employers argue that they are 
going to disburse the retirement payments eventually; however, they are unwilling to contribute more 
money to the Fund whose returns are usually less than their costs of capital.  Since many employers are 
not prepared for massive retirement payments, it is not uncommon to see layoffs, plants shut-down, or 
even terminating the entire business few years before employees are eligible for retirement payments.  
Moreover, workers over 50 years of age have experienced great difficulties of locating new jobs, partly 
because potential employers are not willing to bear the up-coming retirement costs. 
7  Future Developments 
7.1  Making a New Labor Pension Law 
Problems of the Labor Pension system surfaced after only a few years following the enactment of the 
Labor Standards Law in 1985.  Research on a new system has been conducted since 1990.  After 
extensive research and debates, the Executive Yuan prepared the Draft of Statute of Labor Pension in 
December 2001.    It was then submitted to the Legislative Yuan for approval.    According to the Draft, the 
new system will be a defined contribution, portable pension scheme.  Employers’ shall contribute 6% of 
their employees’ salaries each month.  A labor can choose among three plans: Individual Retirement 
Accounts, Additional Annuity, and Other Annuity provided by insurance companies.    However, the Draft 
does not explicitly stipulate the definition of “qualified investment products”, “qualified asset management 
companies,” and even who, labor or government, has the right the choose investment products. 
Individual Retirement Accounts is similar to the 401(k) plan in the United States.  The amount of 
pension when a labor receives will depend on the investment returns in the accumulation period.  
Additional Annuity means annuity in addition to the National Annuity.    But since National Annuity is still 
in its preparation phase, it is somewhat odd to have an Additional Annuity coming out first.  Under its 
design, each year of service will translate into 0.8% replacement ratio.    A labor participating for 30 years 
will receive an annuity equivalent to 24% of average wages, which are linked to the wage level of workers 
who are contributing to the plan then.  If actuarial reports indicate that the plan is under-funded, 
participants will have to make additional contributions.  It is a DC plan wearing a DB coat.  Some 
experts have commented that the 0.8% replacement ratio is not likely to be achieved without labors’ 
additional contributions. 
Other Annuity is offered as group insurance, and only offered to companies hiring more than 300 
people.    There are rumors that advocates of the Additional Annuity plan lobbied hard to put restrictions on 
other plans so that enough people choose the Additional Annuity, which they believe, is immune to the 
financial market volatility and best fits the spirit of social insurance.
3[3] 
If a current worker is satisfied with the pension system under the Labor Standard Law, he/she can 
choose to stay in the original plan.    So there are in fact four plans to choose from.    Most people consider 
the proposed scheme too complicated, and very few actually know how to compare among different plans.   
The fact that a law offers so many alternatives reflects compromises to accommodate different pension 
concepts and industry interests.  Thus, only few are fully satisfied with the Draft, and there exists at east 
10 other alternative drafts in the Legislative Yuan. 
While most experts expect a long battle before a draft can be examined by the Labor, Welfare and 
                                            
3[3] Labor intensive industries have been moving out of Taiwan since 1980s, which has contributed to higher 
unemployment rate and widened income inequality. The ratio of the highest 20% average household income to 
the lowest 20% households has increased from 4.18 in 1980 to 6.16 in 2002.    Social equity has become an 
important issue in Taiwan.   Taiwan 
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Environment Committee, a new draft initiated by legislator Fu-Hsiung Shen quietly went through 
examination in December 31, 2003.      Shen’s draft eliminates the Additional Annuity plan, adds minimum 
return guarantee to the Individual Retirement Account plan and Other Annuity plan, provides tax 
deductions on employees’ voluntary contributions up to 6% of their salaries, and converts Individual 
Retirement Account balance into annuity when labor retires. 
This draft is more comprehensive, and also addresses many concerns over previous drafts.    However, 
there are still issues to be resolved.  For example, participants of the Individual Retirement Account 
cannot determine their investment, which is managed by the government.  It is difficult to determine an 
uniform asset allocation for all participants who have different ages, level of income, attitude towards risk, 
and investment objectives.  Under a DC scheme, participants bear the consequences of their investment 
decisions.  Therefore, it is not reasonable for the government to dominate the investment decisions, even 
though a minimum return is guaranteed.  This also lays enormous pressure on fund officials since 
everybody is watching closely.    Yet another problem is translating the accumulated retirement benefits of 
the old system to the new one.    If a labor has to wait until his/her time of retirement to claim the pension 
under the old system, it is unlikely that he/she will be able to get the payment.    If the employer has to pay 
the accumulated benefits when the new law enacts, many firms will go bankrupt.  Finally, tax officials 
strongly oppose tax reductions on personal contribution, worrying that significant tax revenue cuts would 
worsen the government budget deficit. 
Shen’s draft is expected to be submitted to the full session of the Legislative Yuan for the second and 
third read after the March 20
th presidential election.    It is very likely the new Labor Pension Law will be 
promulgated before the end of 2004. 
7.2  National Pension 
Without first-pillar pension, Taiwan has been relying on the second-pillar and third-pillar pensions, 
along with family supports, to fund the living of the elderly.    In 1993, Executive Yuan conducted a study 
on the National Pension.  In 1995, the Executive Yuan decided to pursue the National Health Insurance 
first, and the National Pension Plan was postponed.    In 1998, a blueprint of National Pension was brought 
up, and the social insurance program was scheduled to launch by 2000.  However, the devastating 
earthquake in 1999, which entailed several hundred billion dollars to rebuild the disastrous area, again 
postponed the National Pension.  Every time the plan is postponed, it would necessitate a new study to 
re-start the plan.  This usually entails an examination of the economic condition of the country, the 
financial capability of the government, the structure of population, the experiences of other countries, or 
even the ruling party, which may have changed through time. 
Taiwanese government had enjoyed a long period of budget surplus until the turn of the century (see 
Table 10).    People start to ask more from the government as Taiwan’s economy develops.    Among those 
demands, social welfare and environmental protection are especially costly.  With one of the lowest tax 
burden in the world, Taiwanese government can not afford an infrastructure of developed countries.  
Moreover, the economic growth has slowed down significantly in recent years, which reduced 
government’s tax revenues and increased government’s spending on social security.  Unfunded pension 
liabilities mentioned in the previous section will put further pressure on future government budget.    Table 
11 calculates the assets needed to fully fund the nation’s elderly with 50% replacement ratio.  In 2000, 
pension assets needed amounts to 128% of GDP.    The number will increase to 176% in 2020 and 252% in 
2050.  On the other hand, total pension assets accumulated are worth less than 10% of GDP in 2003.  
With government budget constraints and an aging population, it will be difficult to launch a large-scale 
national pension program. 
[Insert Table 10] 
[Insert Table 11] 
8  Concluding Remarks 
The new Labor Pension Law is expected to be passed in 2004.    There may be additional revisions to 
the draft before the law is enacted, but major changes, including shifts from defined benefit to defined Taiwan 
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contribution, and from non-portable to portable, are almost certain.  These changes reflect the problems 
that Taiwan’s compulsory occupational pension and social insurance system are currently facing.  The 
huge under-funding of the current scheme has to be accounted for in the future, by increasing contributions, 
extending retirement ages, cutting benefits, or increasing government subsidies.  One way or another, 
younger generations will bear most of the costs.  The aging of the population will undoubtedly further 
magnify the problem. 
A defined contribution system seems to exhibit inter-generational equity features, which provides 
young people more incentives to participate in the pension program.  In addition, it also relieves the 
government from a potential financial black hole commonly observed in defined benefit pensions or social 
insurance programs managed by the government.  A first-pillar national pension program may be 
launched in the next few years.  Given the constraints mentioned above, the program is not likely to be 
large-scaled, providing high replacement ratio for the elderly. 
Taiwan’s political parties compete fiercely in recent years, and there is no sign of mitigation in the 
foreseeable  future.  When  politicians  are generally short-term oriented, reforms for the social security and 
pension systems become slow and unpredictable, sometimes even going backwards.  However, with the 
general publics’ increasing awareness of pension needs, along with significant efforts made by the pension 
society, pension reforms will hopefully be on a right track.Taiwan 
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Table 1 




















Source腆Management Board of Public Service Pension Fund; Supervisory Board of Labor Pension Fund;   
Supervisory Board of Labor Insurance Fund; Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics (DGBAS) 
Executive Yuan, Taiwan, R.O.C.   
* Working population increases to 10.2 million if self-employed and unemployed labor are added.






























6ㄷⰵ㐳 626,652 7,857,842 2,900,000 670,000 NA 
ꅝCꅞ/ꅝAꅞ 2.74% 2.78% 34.89% 12.88% 2.98% NA 
ꅝCꅞ/ꅝBꅞ 6.53% 6.63% 83.15% 30.69% 7.09% NA Taiwan 
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Table 2 
PSPF Actuarially Fair Contribution Ratios for Different Mix of Lump-sum and Monthly Payment. 
 
% of Pension Paid in Monthly Payment  Different 
Participants 0%  10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%  76.3% 80% 90%  100%
Original 
Participants 12.7% 14.9% 17.1% 19.3% 21.7% 24.0% 26.2% 28.5% 29.9% 30.7% 33.0% 35.2%
New 
Participants 10.9% 12.4% 14.0% 15.5% 17.1% 18.6% 20.2% 21.7% 22.7% 23.3% 24.8% 26.4%
Combined 
Participants 11.9% 13.7% 15.6% 17.5% 19.5% 21.4% 23.3% 25.2% 26.4% 27.1% 29.1% 31.0%
 
Source腆2nd Actuary’s Report, Management Board of Public Service Pension Fund, pp.14.Taiwan 
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Table 3 






















Source腆Management Board of Public Service Pension Fund; Supervisory Board of Labor Pension Fund;   
Supervisory Board of Labor Insurance Fund. 












16,002,931,326  7.17% 5,287,432,189  1.66%  32,463,962,373  7.10%
Bank Deposits   




43,317,993,777 19.41% 47,547,489,677 14.91%  4,766,706,790  1.04%
Stocks  
45,735,815,511 20.50% 71,313,572,240 22.37%  88,026,518,582 19.25%
Loan  




52,517,418,429  23.53% 11,832,687,740 3.71%  26,039,067,330 5.69%
Others  
165,243,489 0.07% - 0.00%  2,050,387,494 0.45%
Total  
223,202,630,177 100% 318,803,109,160 100%  457,308,589,722 100%Taiwan 
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Table 4 





































1996 4.83  7.780% 6.930% 0.850% 34.02%
1997 34.66  12.420% 6.292% 6.128% 18.08%
1998 52.86  9.119% 6.313% 2.806% -21.60%
1999 73.98  8.181% 5.846% 2.335% 31.63%
2000 196.92  9.973% 5.142% 4.831% -43.91%
2001 67.13  4.720% 4.016% 0.704% 17.14%
2002 45.43  2.594% 2.246% 0.348% -19.79%
2003/11 37.35  2.023% 1.575% 0.448% 29.63%
Total 513.16  5.819% 4.795% 1.023%Taiwan 
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Table 5 
















Source腆U.S. Bureau of the Census腩forecast腪; Directorate-General of Budget,   
Accounting & Statstics (DGBAS), Executive Yuan, Taiwan, R.O.C.腩2000腪 
Year ¥ 
Age Group 
0 ~ 19  20 ~ 64  65 ~ 
2000 6,578  13,777  1,921 
2005 6,101  14,590  2,203 
2010 5,926  15,176  2,459 
2015 5,692  15,590  2,803 
2020 5,475  15,412  3,551 
2025 5,255  15,003  4,378 
2030 4,985  14,508  5,185 
2035 4,748  14,012  5,797 
2040 4,578  13,518  6,164 
2045 4,437  12,792  6,566 
2050 4,301  12,094  6,809 Taiwan 
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Table 6 
Dependency Ratios of Selected Countries 
2000 2025 2050 








A/B 20-64(A) 65+(B) 
 
A/B
Taiwan  61.8%  8.6%  7.2 61.0% 17.8% 3.4 52.1% 29.3%  1.8 
Japan  62.2%  17.1%  3.6 54.9% 28.0% 2.0 48.5% 34.3%  1.4 
China  61.5%  6.9%  8.9 62.0% 13.7% 4.5 55.5% 24.4%  2.3 
Germany  62.3%  16.4%  3.8 57.9% 24.6% 2.4 52.1% 30.0%  1.7 
Sweden  58.6%  17.2%  3.4 55.8% 23.2% 2.4 54.4% 25.7%  2.1 
U.K.  59.2%  15.6%  3.8 58.7% 20.4% 2.9 54.7% 25.7%  2.1 
U.S.A.  59.0%  12.4%  4.8 55.5% 18.2% 3.1 53.4% 20.6%  2.6 
 
Source腆U.S. Bureau of the Census.Taiwan 
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Table 7 



























1986 65.8  -  25.2  - 4.6  - - 2.0 1.2  1.2  100 
1987 64.0  -  31.9  - - - - 1.4 1.7  1.0  100 
1988 61.8  -  - 34.8  - - - 1.3 1.1  1.0  100 
1989 58.4 8.2  11.9  15.3 2.7  0.8  0.01  0.9 1.2  0.6  100 
1991 52.4 8.1  16.1  15.3 2.7  1.5  - 1.1 1.6  0.7  100 
1993 52.3 6.6  14.8  17.2 4.2  1.9  0.1  0.9 1.6  0.4  100 
1996 48.3 7.3  17.6  13.2 4.3  2.0  0.1  0.4 6.4  0.5  100 
2000 47.1  13.7  15.4 9.3  - - - - 12.9  1.6  100 
  
Source腆Survey of the Elderly, Ministry of the Interior, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, R.O.C.Taiwan 
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Table 8 
Average Monthly Salary of Different Age Groups（2002/05） 
 
 











~49,999 (%) N.T.$ 10,000 
~29,999 (%)
< N.T. $ 
10,000 (%)  N.T. $ 0 (%)
25 ~ 29  4.602 36.770  43.547 3.714 11.368 
30 ~ 34  10.595 44.428  36.422 2.960 5.595 
35 ~ 39  18.167 43.708  30.654 2.503 4.968 
40 ~ 44  19.767 40.756  31.466 3.358 4.654 
45 ~ 49  20.206 34.650  33.184 4.935 7.024 
50 ~ 54  16.614 27.567  36.364 7.979 11.477 
55 ~ 59  11.173 18.268  34.639 12.923 22.997 
60 ~ 64  7.339 9.863  27.615 18.341 36.841 
65 ~ 69  2.583 6.708  23.795 21.744 45.170 
70 ~ 74  1.764 4.551  16.667 20.289 56.729 
75 ~ 79  0.786 4.160  10.134 18.902 66.018 











~49,999 (%) N.T.$ 10,000 
~29,999 (%)
< N.T. $ 
10,000 (%)  N.T. $ 0 (%)
25 ~ 29  1.386 13.704  43.145 4.551 37.214
30 ~ 34  2.942 13.870  33.482 7.548 42.158
35 ~ 39  3.488 12.361  33.354 8.831 41.966
40 ~ 44  4.564 11.161  34.113 8.284 41.878
45 ~ 49  4.401 9.048  29.505 9.819 47.227
50 ~ 54  3.097 4.029  23.001 12.144 57.728
55 ~ 59  2.026 3.126  15.603 13.389 65.856
60 ~ 64  1.590 1.996  10.077 12.730 73.607
65 ~ 69  0.691 1.151  5.394 12.330 80.435
70 ~ 74  0.307 1.096  2.972 12.491 83.135
75 ~ 79  0.188 0.992  2.203 9.625 86.992
80 ~    0.362 0.246  1.380 6.044 91.969Taiwan 
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Table 9 
Labor Insurance Fund’s Cash Balances and Estimated Pension Payments Due腩Unit腆NT$ 10,000腪 
Year  Revenue  Expenditure Balance  Labor Insurance Fund Estimated  Pension 
Payments Due 
1992ꅝ1991/07/01~1992/06/30ꅞ  10,019,996 9,674,242 345,754 6,540,279 13,156,902
1993ꅝ1992/07/01~1993/06/30ꅞ  11,971,467 11,058,065 913,402 7,939,386 17,922,911
1994ꅝ1993/07/01~1994/06/30ꅞ  13,982,960 13,373,102 609,858 10,270,776 21,119,080
1995ꅝ1994/07/01~1995/06/30ꅞ  14,874,760 13,418,969 1,455,791 10,892,133 17,405,237
1996ꅝ1995/07/01~1996/06/30ꅞ  14,033,987 12,281,950 1,752,037 17,065,003 19,177,982
1997ꅝ1996/07/01~1997/06/30ꅞ  14,596,173 14,303,783 292,390 24,267,052 22,019,066
1998ꅝ1997/07/01~1998/06/30ꅞ  15,885,461 15,885,461 0 30,989,120 25,267,007
1999ꅝ1998/07/01~1999/06/30ꅞ  16,935,357 16,935,357 0 37,977,902 30,624,870
2000ꅝ1999/01/01~2000/06/30ꅞ  28,279,115 28,279,115 0 44,656,846 42,567,255
2001ꅝ2000/07/01~2001/06/30ꅞ  17,625,928 17,625,928 0 48,367,488 53,968,650
2002ꅝ2001/07/01~2002/06/30ꅞ  19,295,751 19,295,751 0 45,746,867 65,781,113
 


















Source腆Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting & Statstics (DGBAS), Executive Yuan, Taiwan, R.O.C. 
Year Revenue  Expenditure  SurplusꅝDeficitꅞ 
1997ꅝ1996/07/01~1997/06/30ꅞ  1,153,325,585,937.00 1,153,325,585,937.00  0
1998ꅝ1997/07/01~1998/06/30ꅞ  1,296,725,824,543.87 1,189,848,539,388.00  106,877,285,155.87 
1999ꅝ1998/07/01~1999/06/30ꅞ  1,284,760,933,337.03 1,282,183,102,956.00 2,577,830,381.03 
2000ꅝ1999/01/01~2000/06/30ꅞ  2,035,434,797,500.29 2,230,757,964,012.00  -195,323,166,511.71 
2001ꅝ2000/07/01~2001/06/30ꅞ  1,417,688,510,289.47 1,560,178,254,655.00  -142,489,744,365.53
2002ꅝ2001/07/01~2002/06/30ꅞ  1,305,741,429,004.88 1,552,162,107,585.00  -246,420,678,580.12 Taiwan 
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Table 11 
Pension Assets Needed to Support a 50% Replacement Ratio腩Unit腆% of GDP腪 腩2004/02/04腪 
Year  Assets before Retirement  Assets after Retirement  Total  Real Reserve 
1990 84%  35%  119%  0% 
2000 79%  46%  125%  4% 
2010 76%  53%  129%  NA 
2020 77%  75%  153%  NA 
2030 83%  117%  200%  NA 
2040 87%  149%  237%  NA 
2050 93%  184%  278%  NA 
 
Source腆Financial Integration Consulting & Research Inc. Taiwan 
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Figure 1 













Source腆U.S. Bureau of the Census腩forecast腪; Directorate-General of Budget,   
Accounting & Statstics (DGBAS), Executive Yuan, Taiwan, R.O.C.腩2000腪 
 
 